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CHAPTER 2 
Mainstreaming Framework Conditions for 




The term “environmental finance” in this paper refers to standard financing products 
of commercial banks for investments in clean technology. Investments in EE&RE 
products represent the main potential market for these. Whereas the existence of a 
potentially large market for investments in EE&RE is beyond doubt, its realization 
needs unlocking. In unlocking the market potential, the public sector has two roles to 
perform: (i) to introduce a set of incentive instruments to create a large-scale and 
long-term demand; and (ii) to coordinate the activities of actors (supply-side ac-
tions). Concerted CT deployment programs comprise an integrated package of envi-
ronmental finance, together with “demand pull” and “technical supply-side” meas-
ures to create demand for investments. As incentive to include environmental fi-
nance in their product portfolios, banks may require the inclusion of a “bank en-
gagement program”, comprising measures that reduce their risks, their costs of 
transaction and their costs of capacity building, during the market upstart phase. 
Successful programs are complex. Yet a large number of instruments exist to cus-
tomize solutions to local conditions, and the know-how to design and implement in-
tegrated packages is becoming increasingly well-established. 
1 Demand for CT: A Condition for Environmental Finance 
For the purposes of this paper, “environmental finance” is defined as “standardized 
financing products for clean technology (CT)1 offered by financial institutions as 
                                                          
*  Director, W. Mostert Associates. 
1 The term “clean technology” (CT), as shorthand for “environmental technology,” refers 
to technologies that have a lower consumption of materials and fuels and release fewer 
emissions into the air, water, and soil than conventional technologies. They comprise: (i) 
technologies in energy efficiency and in renewable energy systems, (ii) production tech-
nologies for saving water and raw material, and (iii) technologies in investments for re-
ducing end-of-pipe pollution that recover materials for reuse. 
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part of their own business strategy”.2 Thus, the subject concerns the mainstream-
ing of finance for the mass market of small scale investments in CT made by small 
businesses, households and public institutions. Because energy efficiency (EE) 
and renewable energy (RE) technologies represent the bulk of the CT market, this 
paper examines only EE&RE technologies. Framework conditions in emerging 
and developing countries are the main focus, but for reference purposes examples 
from OECD countries are also included.  
In order to mainstream environmental finance, the financial sector requires 
first and foremost a framework that creates the right market demand for its prod-
ucts. One can gain a good understanding of the ideal market conditions for envi-
ronmental finance by looking at the characteristics of products that banks in 
emerging and developing economies are eager to finance: real estate, mobile 
phone vendors, cars and motorcycles. The most important are: 
1. The annual demand for finance is large and “perpetual”, giving banks good 
prospects for productivity. 
2. Bank staff understand the products; hence, banks face low costs for internal 
training.  
Thus, mainstreaming of environmental finance requires a framework that creates a 
large and long-term demand for standardised CT finance products. Large demand 
justifies upfront investments in internal capacity building and permits the develop-
ment of standardised financial products; standardisation reduces transaction costs. 
The framework conclusion is confirmed by statements from the financial com-
munity. At the “Renewables Conference” held in 2004 in Bonn, the financial 
community issued the following statement: “Strength, clarity, and stability are de-
cisive characteristics of the policy that attracts capital to renewable energy: that 
policy must be specific enough to improve the bankability of projects and provide 
conditions for steady market growth in the renewables sector. An effective policy 
framework must be ‘loud, long, and legal’: (i) The signal to the market, through 
incentive structures or other means, needs to be ‘loud’ and clear to attract capital 
into the sector; (ii) Rules and incentives need to be stable and sustained for a dura-
tion that reflects the financing horizons of the projects; (iii) A legally-established 
regulatory framework based around binding targets or implementation mecha-
nisms is needed to provide the basis for long-life capital-intensive investments.” 3  
                                                          
2 The term “environmental finance” refers to “commercial financial products that assists 
the deployment of CT-products”; these finance user investments in CT. However, in-
vestments in emission reductions that are enforced by Government regulations (e.g. 
waste water treatment facilities) fall outside the theme of environmental finance; they 
form part of general investments in production technology. Corporate investments in the 
supply chain for CT products and services are not covered by the narrow definition of 
environmental finance used in this paper. 
3 Hamilton & Sonntag (2004). 
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Investments in EE&RE of relevance for environmental finance have long life-
times and long payback periods. Environmental finance comprises primarily me-
dium and long-term loans; these require longer-term certainty for the continuation 
of the conditions that motivate investment. This is why the finance community 
needs signals that are long and legal. 
The finance community needs a loud signal because environmental finance is a 
new and, until recently, was a small niche field for the finance industry. To moti-
vate the entry investments by the finance community into the development of an 
environmental finance portfolio, the medium to long-term market prospects for 
environmental finance products must be good.  
2 Clean Technology: A Potential Market That Needs 
Unlocking 
2.1 A Large Potential Market with a Long-Term Future 
A short look at the characteristics of the CT market helps to understand the hesi-
tancy of banks during the initial market development stages. Table 1 shows the 
British Government’s estimates of carbon emissions in the industrial, public and 
household sectors in the UK.  
Table 1. UK Carbon Emissions (2002) by Sector 
 Number of entities Annual carbon 
emissions 
In percent of total 
Energy intensive in-
dustry 
2,400 25 Mtc 25,5% 
Large non-energy in-
tensive organisations 
13,200 13 Mtc 13,3% 
SMEs 909,000 10 Mtc 10,2% 
Public sector  8 Mtc 8,1% 
Households 21,000,000 42 Mtc 42,9% 
  98 Mtc 100% 
Source: HM Treasury (2005) 
Roughly 25% of annual carbon emissions come from the 2,400 large energy inten-
sive entities. EE and the use of RE are part of their core know-how in process 
technology and are financed as part of overall corporate finance; the financing of 
their investments is not, therefore, relevant to the topic of environmental finance 
addressed in this chapter. The market segment for environmental finance is made 
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up of the relatively small-scale investments in EE&RE made by the 13,200 large 
non-energy intensive firms, the 909,000 SMEs, the 21 million households, the 
public sector and finally, the suppliers for these. The financial situation and spe-
cific EE&RE needs of the segments are very heterogeneous. 
Cost-of-supply curves for CO2 mitigation typically show a large cost-effective 
EE&RE potential. An example is the UK cost of abatement curve shown in the 
table overleaf.4 The “negative cost measures” in the chart refer to investments in 
EE&RE which are cost-effective for private investors based on their financial re-
turn from energy savings without separate payments for achieved carbon reduc-
tions. In developing countries, “positive cost measures” are the target for CDM-
projects and programs. 
 
Fig. 1. 2030 UK cost curve for additional greenhouse gas reduction measures 
Source: CBI (2007) 
The combined message from Table 1 and Fig. 1 is that the cumulative market for 
environmental finance for EE&RE is potentially very large.  
2.2 A Market Potential That Needs to Be Tapped 
While EE&RE policy has become part of the mainstream in energy policy in most 
countries, at least since 2004, the potential market in individual countries still 
needs unlocking. Three major and interlocked obstacles to investments in cost-
effective EE&RE measures are listed below: 
                                                          
4 Copied from CBI (2007), see also Enkvist & Nauclèr & Rosander (2007). 
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1. Competing options and needs. During times of rapid economic growth, 
investments in cost savings (“defensive investments”) are lower on the pri-
ority list of enterprises than investments in capacity expansion (“offensive 
investments”). During periods of low growth in demand for their products 
and services when companies turn their attention to cost saving measures, 
managers can find profitable efficiency improvements “everywhere”: in 
staffing levels, purchase and stock policies, etc. Managers aim at minimiz-
ing overall inefficiency in the company, not just in a specific area such as 
EE. For investments outside the core activity (i.e. in support services and 
ancillary services), firms apply the 20/80 rule: that 80% of a potentially 
achievable result can be realised with 20% of the effort required to reach 
100%. Households show a similar investment optimising attitude: when a 
new house is purchased, they invest in a new kitchen and/or in a new bath-
room rather than in the EE-investments recommended in the energy certifi-
cate for the house. The first lead to visible improvements, the latter repre-
sent one financial investment opportunity amongst others.  
2. Asymmetric information about EE benefits. Due to lack of required spe-
cialised technical knowledge, household consumers and small businessmen 
are unable to know whether a set of cost-saving measures proposed by a 
vendor or technician really results in the promised financial savings to the 
investor.  
3. CT technologies have higher upfront investment costs than conventional 
technology. This is why terms for “environmental finance” that reduce the 
level of upfront equity finance to the legal minimum and give investors a 
positive operating cash flow from the first year after the investment are ab-
solutely essential.  
2.3 Generic Framework for Environmental Finance 
Banks will engage in lending for clean technologies only if they are convinced 
that the government’s promotion policy is durable. The credibility of that depends 
on the quality of the implemented framework.  
Due to the interlocked nature of the obstacles to market development, effective 
frameworks to promote environment finance are complex, consisting of packages 
of complementary and mutually reinforcing instruments. To see what works and 
what does not, governments, therefore, monitor the outcomes of their support 
packages and look at international experiences for inspiration. 
Best practice is always based on circumstance: concepts for market transforma-
tion through public initiatives cannot be copied successfully without significant 
adaptations to specific local conditions. Although framework conditions vary from 
one country to another, the contours of a framework for environment finance 
which is generally applicable can be established. The framework shown in Fig. 2 
groups government interventions by three major categories of instruments: “de-
mand pull”, “technology push” and “finance push” instruments. 
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Creating Demand for Investments in Clean Technologies










Financial Sector offers tailor made and standardised

















Fig. 2. Generic Public Framework for Environmental Finance 
“Demand pull” instruments increase demand for CTs directly; they are used to 
overcome the motivation hurdle to investments posed by competing wants and 
needs. Instruments include pricing/tariff policies, information campaigns to create 
consumer awareness, environmental regulations and enforcement, and power mar-
kets that facilitate entry of generation using renewable energy.  
“Technology push” (or technical supply side) instruments affect demand for CTs 
indirectly by strengthening the quantity and quality of CT products and services and 
reducing their costs. They include information to consumers about the CT-
characteristics of products, technical assistance to actors in the supply chain, moni-
toring and quality control of supply, and public procurement policies favouring CT. 
The aim of some of these measures is to give consumers confidence in the products 
and advisory services, overcoming the problem of asymmetric information. 
“Finance push instruments” (or bank engagement programs) aim to increase the 
supply of environmental finance: these are tailor-made products which reduce the 
hurdle of high upfront investment costs. Instruments comprise refinancing lines, 
financial sector regulations that facilitate environmental finance, assistance in es-
tablishing non-conventional financing channels, and measures to reduce bank trans-
action costs and lending risks.  
Figure 2 shows a coherent national deployment strategy: three packages inter-
act to create a market demand for clean technology. Banks look at the framework 
from a slightly different angle. For them, the essential aspects of the technical 
supply side and finance push measures are not that they assist in demand creation. 
Rather, banks are interested in how technical supply side measures can assist the 
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development of standardised clean finance products and to what extent bank en-
gagement programs reduce initial bank barriers to entry. 
The following three chapters look at the framework as seen through the lenses 
of the financial community. As far as possible, each chapter structures the treat-
ment of subjects to start with those that are the most important for banks. 
3 Demand Pull Instruments: Signals That Are Loud, Long 
and Legal  
3.1 Legal Signals: Fixing Policy Targets for EE&RE 
Long-term government commitment to the development of a CT-market is ex-
pressed by lawmakers’ adoption of a long-term policy for CT comprised of (i) 
quantified targets for the penetration of CT by a fixed date, (ii) an action program, 
(iii) long-term forecasts for the financial implications for the national budget, and 
(iv) specified budget allocations for the initial years.  
Quantified targets without specified commitments and budgeted action plans 
have little chance of implementation. The risk of underperformance is high in 
EE&RE and CO2-mitigation policies, because they do not affect the population 
directly as, say, underperformance in health or education policies. Postponing the 
achievement of a target by a few years is, therefore, not an election losing exercise. 
The experience of Egypt’s policy targets for RE during the last 20 years illustrates 
the situation in many OECD and developing countries. In 1986, Egypt adopted a 
penetration target for new RE equal to 3% of final energy supply in the year 2000. 
Ten years later, the 3% target for RE was postponed to 2010 and shortly after 
2000 redefined to refer to 3% of electricity supply in 2010.  
Because of such experiences, many clean technology advocates prefer to see 
long-term quantitative targets enshrined in a law rather than in the form of a cabi-
net decision, as the latter is easier to adjust. Turning a quantitative policy target 
into a legal obligation is happening for CO2-mitigation policies in Annex I coun-
tries5 because of international treatises and conventions. In the EU, directives im-
posing CO2-emission reduction and RE penetration targets for 2020 are sub-
translated into specific targets for each member country. But in the emerging and 
developing economies, the legal target approach is not likely to be adopted in the 
near future. In these countries, the financing community will be more impressed 
by the quality of the framework as a guide to credibility, rather than by the formal 
adoption in a law of a very long-term goal – such as the UK’s 2050 target of an 80 
percent reduction in carbon emissions! 
                                                          
5 The industrialised countries and economies in transition listed in Annex I of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Their responsibilities under the 
Convention include a binding commitment to reducing their GHG emissions relative to 
1990 levels by the year 2012. 
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A more immediate priority, therefore, is to improve the quality of the policy mak-
ing process which adopts the targets. A major reason for non-compliance with po-
litically fixed targets for EE&RE market shares is that the target is fixed by govern-
ment in a top-down, ad hoc manner with little reference to detailed economic cost-
benefit calculations. A bottom-up approach to fix penetration targets for EE&RE is 
to set targets for individual sectors according to the economically viable EE&RE 
potential in each sector. The resulting overall penetration target is more credible, 
because it reflects the marginal cost-effectiveness of EE&RE and because the moni-
toring of outcomes at the sector level allows planners to react faster with changes in 
policy instruments when results do not live up to expectations.  
3.2 Rational Policies for Energy Prices 
A second, immediate priority is the introduction of rational pricing policies that 
are socially balanced. The elimination of subsidies to fossil fuels and electricity 
tariffs sends a louder and longer “legal” signal than the introduction of subsidies 
to EE&RE.  
The typical situation in developing and emerging economies is summarized in 
Table 2. 
Table 2. Pricing of Fossil Fuels and Electricity in Developing and Emerging Economies 








diesel, gasoline  
Net exporters 
of energy 
Subsidized Subsidized Lifelines tariffs Subsidized 
Net importers 
of energy 







OECD countries usually adopt sensible pricing policies, directly promoting the 
deployment of CT through “green taxation” (taxes on fossil fuels, electricity, wa-
ter, disposable containers and waste). Taxation policy may be inefficient – lobby-
ists can skew taxation in favour of specific interests, but overall, the price signals 
point in the right direction. 
Many fuel-importing developing countries use taxes on fossil fuels to save for-
eign exchange and raise revenue for the state budget. Yet, also in these countries, 
household fuels are often subsidized to reduce the impact of increasing fuel prices 
on the financial situation of lower-income groups.  
Developing countries that are net exporters of energy tend to give high subsidies 
to hydro-carbon fuels and to electricity, thereby undermining the creation of a mar-
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ket for EE&RE. In 2008, Egypt spend almost USD 11 billion on energy subsidies, 
equivalent to 5% of GDP, more than on the government budgets for education (USD 
6 billion) and health care (USD 3 billion) combined.6 Malaysia had one of the big-
gest fuel subsidy bills in the world, estimated at as much as 7% of GDP in 2008, be-
fore the government took the decision to increase prices by 40% in June 2008.7  
Governments in developing countries are fully aware of the damaging effect of 
high energy subsidies on the economy: the price distortion leads to inefficient allo-
cation of resources in the free market, while the financial burden on the public 
budget crowds out high value support to education, health and infrastructure. They 
also know that the equity impact of energy subsidies is deficient: since higher-
income households consume more energy, wealthier households receive more 
subsidy support than poorer households. The exceptions are well-designed elec-
tricity lifeline tariffs for small levels of monthly electricity consumption that are 
cross-subsidized by higher-consuming households and subsidies to kerosene. 
To replace energy subsidies with direct social income support is, therefore, in 
principle attractive to policymakers.8 Nevertheless, many governments in develop-
ing countries believe that they cannot implement such schemes because (i) they 
cannot identify low-income households that are eligible for a social income sub-
sidy as many live in the informal economy, and (ii) they do not have the local 
government capability to administer cash transfer schemes. Governments, who 
during 2008 approved increases in energy prices, therefore tried other avenues to 
reduce the burden on the poor: imposing price controls on more basic goods, sub-
sidizing public transport and spending on infrastructure investments to create jobs. 
Yet, social survey methods to pinpoint the poor have been applied successfully in 
a number of countries and a number of innovative delivery channels are used to 
overcome the problem of weak local administrative capacity. 
3.3 RE&EE Subsidies and Use of Regulation 
The long-term credibility of a scheme to support the deployment of EE&RE de-
pends on its cost-effectiveness. It depends on three aspects: (i) the quality of sub-
sidy design, (ii) use of new loan instruments or (iii) use of regulation when this is 
feasible and more efficient.  
Criteria for Identification and Optimisation of Subsidy Instruments 
Although in principle subsidies are a scarce good, the cost-effectiveness of many 
national schemes in developed countries, compared to feasible alternatives, is sur-
                                                          
6 Friedman (2008). 
7 The Economist May 2008. 
8 Many economies in transition managed the transformation from subsidized household 
energy prices to full cost prices by letting municipal administrations pay part of the 
monthly energy bills of low-income households directly to utilities. 
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prisingly low. Too many schemes over-compensate beneficiaries, have high free 
rider effects and distort markets unnecessarily. In less-rich developing countries, 
such RE&EE schemes would have a very short lifetime. 
A variety of subsidy instruments are used to strengthen the demand for 
EE&RE.9 The primary objective of making investments in CT commercially vi-
able can be achieved by “any” subsidy. Optimisation, as illustrated in Figure 3, 
calls for taking into account a number of design criteria  
x Impact effectiveness: the scheme must lead to a significant expansion of the 
market and to cost reductions in CT, and generate employment and foreign 
exchange earnings/savings. 
x Distributional efficiency: planners do not want to over-compensate inves-
tors, create big distortions on the market (e.g. by giving RE-generators too 
many exemptions from the general rules of the power market) or set up a 
system that imposes high administrative costs on recipients and on the pub-
lic administrator of the scheme.  
x Burden sharing efficiency: the schemes should not impose a heavy burden 
on low-income households or on energy intensive industries that are sub-
ject to fierce foreign competition nor lead to unwanted redistribution of in-







II. Resource Allocation Efficiency
Cost of support per generated kWh
Transaction costs
Power market distortion
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III. Burden sharing efficiency
DESIGN
OBJECTIVES
Sharing of RE sur-costs 
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Fig. 3. Criteria for Optimisation of Subsidy Schemes to EE & RE 
                                                          
9 RE&EE subsidies have three sources of finance: (i) the state budget; (ii) consumers of 
conventional energy; and (iii) grant funds and soft loans from clean technology funds for 
international carbon finance. A subsidy can be given to (i) the cost of investment, (ii) to 
output, or (iii) to costs of operation. get-neutral. See Lindlein & Mostert (2005) for a 
presentation of subsidy instruments using the “financing source-subsidy target” matrix. 
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In countries worldwide, one can see a trend towards increasing sophistication of 
policy instruments for EE&RE.10 Recent subsidy schemes in emerging and devel-
oping economies are remarkably well-designed. Inter alia, they include efforts to 
identify budget neutral subsidies; as such, they touch the core of the optimisation 
issue, which is subsidy affordability for the government: 
The Ministry of Energy in Tunisia convinced the Tunisian Ministry of Finance 
of the benefits of introducing a per-system subsidy to solar water heaters. The de-
cisive argument was that solar water heaters replace consumption of subsidized 
Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) for water heating and that, according to calcula-
tions, the reduction in replaced subsidy payments to LPG was higher than the cost 
of the subsidies to solar water heaters.  
x Egypt has a dual price system for its national natural gas production. Natu-
ral gas consumed in Egypt is priced at the “cost of production”, exports of 
gas at the “price from export contracts”. Output from grid-connected wind 
farms replaces power generation at natural gas-fired power plants, allowing 
Egypt to use saved gas consumption to increase its exports of gas (mainly 
in the form of LNG). The decision was taken to split the increase in gas 
revenue 50%/50% between the Ministry of Oil and a Renewable Energy 
Fund, which was created under the Ministry of Electricity. The REF pays a 
subsidy per kWh to wind farms, which they receive on top of the electricity 
tariff per kWh paid by the national transmission company.  
x The Sri Lanka Sustainable Energy Fund is funded by a variety of sources, 
making its long-term viability a high probability.11 The objective of the 
fund is to support investments in EE&RE; first and foremost investments in 
RE generation, which are paid technology-specific feed-in-tariffs by the na-
tional power company CEB.12 The fund reimburses the power company for 
the difference between (a) the average cost per kWh of conventional gen-
eration in the system13 and (b) the feed-in-tariffs. The strategic objective of 
the mechanism is dual: to secure sustainable funding for EE&RE invest-
ments, yet avoid political opposition from CEB due to costs imposed on 
CEB by an increased penetration of RE generation. 
                                                          
10 See IEA (2008) and OPTRES (2008). 
11 See Sri Lanka Sustainable Energy Authority Act, No.35, 2007. 
12 Technology-specific feed-in-tariffs pay different tariffs for different technologies, reflect-
ing differences in their average costs of production per generated kWh. In order to allow a 
broader portfolio of investments to enter the market, higher-cost technologies (e.g. solar 
PV-systems) get a higher tariff than lower cost technologies (e.g. wind turbines). 
13 The average cost of the tariffs paid to independent power producers (IPPs) using thermal 
power and the costs of the production generation plants owned by CEB, which are 
mainly medium-scale hydropower,. 
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Mixing Subsidies and Long-Term Loans 
A separate optimisation issue is the balance and interaction between the subsidy 
instrument and the loan finance instrument. The barrier of high upfront costs of 
SME and household investments in EE&RE can be reduced by a combination of 
up-front grants and use-specific long-term loans on favourable terms. Together, 
these two instruments must bring the up-front cash payment down to the feasible 
minimum and reduce the annual cash payments during the amortisation period to a 
level which is below the payments for saved conventional energy.  
Often loans are sufficient to overcome an initial purchase hurdle. Some demand 
side management programs, for example, give compact fluorescent lamps (CFLs) 
to households free of charge. A more efficient alternative are schemes where 
commercial banks lend funds to the electricity distribution utilities for purchasing 
CFLs that are distributed or sold to clients. Clients do not pay for the bulbs up-
front; rather, the utility adds a loan amortisation surcharge to the monthly utility 
bill until the loan is fully repaid. In Sri Lanka, the electricity distribution compa-
nies CEB and LECO provided interest-free loans to customers to purchase up to 
three CFLs. The loans were repayable in 12 monthly instalments and were recov-
ered through the electricity bill. An independent testing facility was established to 
authorise the different brands of CFLs. 
3.4 Balance Between Market Based and Regulatory Instruments for 
Market Expansion 
Governments have a large arsenal of instruments to draw from: catalogues of 
laws, regulations and policy instruments can be found on relevant websites.14 In-
struments for creating a higher demand for EE&RE technologies can be divided 
into two categories: 
1. “Command and control instruments”: 
x Regulations imposing use of EE&RE technologies 
x Norms and standards for EE in buildings, appliances and vehicles 
x “Voluntary agreements”, negotiated agreements between industry asso-
ciations and governments to attain specific targets for EE 
2. “Market based instruments”: 
x Incentives for action: economic and financial incentives for investing in 
EE 
x Information: EE labeling, information campaigns, demonstration projects 
                                                          
14 See IEA’s Energy Efficiency Policies and Measures Database http://www.iea.org/textbase/ 
pm/index_effi.asp or American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy’s http://www. 
aceee.org/energy/state/ for measures in US states. 
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For every instrument, there exists an alternative. Energy efficient lamps, for ex-
ample, can be promoted by a package of market instruments, e.g. promotion cam-
paigns, grants and utility-based lending; or through use of regulation, for example 
interdicting sales of incandescent lamps. A third optimization issue concerns the 
balance between the use of grant/market instruments and the use of regulatory in-
struments. When should which be used? 
Market-based instruments have a comparative advantage in “promoting good 
practice”. They are most effective when incentives for action (investment grants, 
soft loans, loan guarantees, tax credits, and fossil fuel taxation) are combined with 
effective know-how building (information on the advantages of EE through labeling, 
demonstration projects, support to advisory offices, and promotion campaigns). The 
importance of government-financed awareness15 and information16 campaigns is 
well-established. Whereas information about CT characteristics, availability of advi-
sory services and environmental finance is straightforward, still very little is known 
about how to design effective awareness campaigns that can change consumer be-
haviour and lifestyles towards “energy modesty”.  
Command and control instruments are used, above all, to address systemic 
causes of market failure; their comparative advantage is in preventing bad prac-
tices. Examples from EE are (i) norms for fuel efficiency in new cars, where pro-
gress in efficiency was undermined by consumer preferences for horse power, ac-
celeration and advanced air conditioning (all promoted by marketing campaigns 
from car manufacturers); and (ii) norms for EE of apartment buildings, where EE 
faces market obstacles such as landlord-tenant differences of interest. Regulations 
imposing energy audits and compulsory investments in non-energy intensive in-
dustries, where energy is just one cost factor among many that compete for man-
agement attention, are an example of promoting good practice. For environmental 
finance the most important regulations are: 
x Regulations for EE and RE in building codes; 
x Regulations for labelling of appliances; and 
x Regulations for the integration of rooftop photo-voltaic (PV) systems in 
power market transactions. 
Building codes17 impose standards for EE18 in new construction.19 EE standards 
are a good instrument in theory; in practice, they suffer from severe implementation  
                                                          
15 To create interest in EE&RE, most effectively through information on the financial bene-
fits of EE&RE. 
16 About technical options, available technical products, service companies and conditions 
for environmental finance. 
17 Building codes for EE exist in two forms. Prescriptive codes set separate performance lev-
els for major envelope and equipment components, such as minimum thermal resistance of 
walls. Due to easier enforcement, they are the most common. Overall performance-based 
codes prescribe an annual energy consumption level per square meter of floor area or an 
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and enforcement problems. Only 40% of new buildings comply with building 
codes in the UK; this figure is as low as 20% in the Netherlands (depending on 
effectiveness of monitoring activity by the local municipality) and 5% in China. 
Since countries increasingly apply full-cost-of-supply tariffs for industrial and 
commercial customers, there is a potential market for standardised EE packages 
for industrial and commercial buildings. However, it is prudent to conclude that in 
most emerging and developing countries the situation is not ripe for the develop-
ment of tailor-made environmental finance for standard EE-packages in residential 
building renovations. It is more cost-effective to focus on improving the enforce-
ment mechanisms for the building code for new buildings: annual additions to the 
building stock in emerging economies are much higher than in developed econo-
mies due to the positive growth rates of their national populations and the fact that 
demand for building space increases with the growth in per capita income.  
EE standards are also introduced for major energy consuming appliances; yet, 
the enforcement record here is also mixed. Thailand implemented energy effi-
ciency standards for air conditioning and refrigerators as part of a DSM program. 
Although similar labelling programs were introduced for refrigerators and air-
conditioning systems, significant energy savings were achieved only for refrigera-
tors. In the case of air conditioning, where the number of manufacturers was very 
high in contrast to the number of refrigerator manufacturers, serious enforcement 
problems occurred. The air-conditioning market would have needed stricter en-
forcement and stronger market intervention strategies. 
The components of a sustainable regulatory framework for investments in small-
scale distributed (embedded) generation such as rooftop PV systems are well known: 
x Compulsory rules imposed on distribution companies for grid connection; 
x Feed-in-tariff for surplus (or total) sales of electricity from the PV-system 
to the distribution grid; and  
x Rules for net metering.20 
                                                          
energy cost budget. They provide more scope and incentives for innovation, but require 
better trained building officials and inspectors. Building codes for RE require instalment of 
building integrated RE-systems (e.g. rooftop PV-systems, solar water heater systems) in 
new construction (covering a minimum percentage of the building’s energy consumption) 
or provide for reservation of space for later instalment of RE systems in or on the building. 
18 “EE buildings” are buildings that achieve low levels of annual energy consumption 
through a mixture of (i) architectural design, (ii) use of highly-insulating materials in-
cluding EE-glass and window frames, (iii) EE cooling & heating, ventilation and light-
ing systems, (iv) power supply from building integrated PV (BIPV) and (v) water saving 
measures. 
19 In the EU codes also apply for existing buildings in connection with major renovations. 
20 Net metering allows the building or home owner to sell to the grid any excess electricity 
generated by the PV installation; the customer’s electric meter will run backward when 
the solar electric system produces more power than is needed to operate the home that 
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4 Technical Supply Chain: Standardisation 
Through Coordination 
4.1 Linking Standardised EE&RE Products to Standardized Finance 
A bank can introduce standardised finance products only for standardised CT 
products. Among relevant EE&RE products one can distinguish between “off-the-
shelf” products for stand-alone applications and products that are integrated com-
ponents of buildings or of industrial processes. 
Examples of the first category are solar PV-panels, solar water heaters and, at 
the micro-scale: compact fluorescent lamps. Standardisation for these means 
building “guarantees” for quality through equipment specifications and standards 
for products, and through certification of qualified vendors and installers who par-
ticipate in government-sponsored promotion campaigns. 
EE-equipment for industrial processes and EE-retrofitting of industrial, public 
and private buildings are examples of the latter. Here, standardisation involves: 
1. Environmental/energy audits in industry and energy certificates for build-
ings. Standardisation in this case is not in terms of content, but in terms of 
guaranteed quality: investment packages with CT benefits are identified by 
specialised experts and have a positive financial rate of return. Because au-
dits present a package of individual measures, investors can ask banks to 
finance either some of the measures or the whole package. 
2. Model ESCO contracts for energy saving contracts and energy supply con-
tracts.21 These are particularly important for promoting energy savings in 
the public sector and for creating sufficient national demand for the opera-
tion of ESCO-companies. 
4.2 Capacity Building and Quality Control in the Technical Supply Chain 
For the future of environmental finance, it is essential that consumers have faith in 
the quality of promoted products, in their installation and in the availability after-
sales-service. Governments use two complementary instruments to promote qual-
ity in the supply chain: one is capacity building, the other is regulation.  
                                                          
time. A special utility-grade inverter converts the DC power from the PV modules into 
AC power that exactly matches the voltage and frequency of the electricity flowing in 
the utility line; the system must also meet the utility’s safety and power-quality require-
ments. In the event of a power outage, safety switches in the inverter automatically dis-
connect the PV system from the line. 
21 ESCOs are companies that perform energy audits and invest in the identified package of 
EE-measures at the plant of the beneficiary. Beneficiaries have no net cash costs. The 
ESCO is paid out of a pre-defined share of the value of energy savings during operation 
until the “loan” is amortised. 
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A number of countries can boast good results with dedicated capacity building 
programs. Tunisia and Morocco, for example, implemented successful capacity 
building programs for “solateurs” (installers of water heater systems).  
A necessary supplementary instrument used in public support programs for 
EE&RE is regulation: to have access to a subsidy, investors must get the work 
done by certified experts, vendors and installers who have participated in special-
ised training courses; often there is a list of qualified vendors and experts for in-
vestors to choose from. The system involves random checks of the quality of exe-
cuted works and withdrawal of licenses for dealers and/or installers that do not 
perform. In this way, for example, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal managed to 
create country-wide dealer and retailer networks for solar PV-systems. 
4.3 Increasing Supply by Lowering Costs of Entry for Service Providers 
Governments use several tools to increase the number of companies providing CT 
products and services:  
x Increase of the supply of qualified experts by introducing Master of Science 
courses at universities in EE&RE and by offering EE&RE courses at voca-
tional training institutes 
x Direct assistance for the creation of specialized companies, e.g. by organis-
ing training courses given by foreign specialists in the organisation and fi-
nancing of ESCOs 
x Public procurement of EE&RE services through mandated energy audits 
and investment programs for public buildings. This is important in particu-
lar to build sufficient national demand for the operation of energy service 
companies (ESCOs). 
x Facilitating the rental of high-cost specialised equipment  
For example; Sri Lanka eases the entry of new-comers in EE-consulting and en-
gineering through the facilitation of an instrument bank22 and calibration ser-
vices, both are rented out on an ad-hoc short term basis by the Sustainable En-
ergy Authority.  
4.4 National and Local Governments as Organisers of Supply Chain 
Networks 
Market transformation through public policy is by definition implemented through 
public-private-partnerships (PPPs). Several sophisticated and successful PPPs for 
                                                          
22 Comprising flue gas analyzer, temperature data loggers, power analyzer, portable power 
meter, air flow meter, temperature, humidity & TDS meter. 
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the promotion of EE&RE have been implemented in OECD and in emerging and 
developing countries. In this section, the first example provided is of a program 
coordinated under the auspices of central government; the second is coordinated 
under the auspices of local government. 
National Government as Facilitator of Financial and Technical Supply Networks 
In 2005 Tunisia launched the Progamme Solaire, or PROSOL program, which 
uses a number of innovative instruments and broad collaboration between gov-
ernment agencies, the national power company, the financial sector and solar sys-
tem installers to achieve its results. PROSOL is implemented jointly by: 
x the Ministry of Industry and Energy,  
x the national agency for EE, Agence Nationale pour la Maîtrise de l’Énergie 
(ANME),  
x the national power company, Société Tunisienne de l’Electricité et de Gaz 
(STEG),  
x the financial sector, and  
x solar water heater dealers and installers.  
Financial and technical assistance support provided by PROSOL is co-financed by 
the state, the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the United Nations Develop-
ment Program (UNDP) and the Italian government.  
PROSOL focused initially on the promotion of 200 and 300-litre solar water 
heating systems for residences aiming to install 500,000 m2 by 2009. Financial 
support to solar water heaters (SWHs) comprises a direct subsidy as well as an in-
vestment rate subsidy. SWHs get a subsidy of 100 DT (EUR 59) per m2 up to a 
total sum of TND 400, which amounts to 19% of the installed price of a 200 liter 2 
m2. SWH (price of TND 1100) and to 22–27% of the installed price for a 300 liter 
4 m2 system (TND 500–1800).23 The purchase of a 2 m2 SWH costing TND 1100 
is financed by the subsidy of TND 200 and a consumer cash payment of TND 
150; the remaining TND 750 is financed by a five-year bank loan with an interest 
rate of 7% instead of the usual 14%, and which is repaid through a surcharge on 
the monthly electricity bill.  
The interest rate reduction is achieved partly by a USD 2 million GEF grant, 
and partly by STEG administering the amortization of the loan on behalf of the 
banks, which reduces the costs of transaction for the banks and eliminates the 
need for collateral. Installers are in principle authorized: ANME gives short-
                                                          
23 The state budget provides USD 2.5m to finance the cost of the subsidy, the two donor-
financed programs MEREP and MEDREC an additional USD2m. The state provided 
subsidy amount is, however, compensated by replaced LPG-consumption, which saves 
the state USD 2.5m per year when the 700,000 m2 target has been reached! 
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term training courses (1–3 day courses) to installers, but in practice the criteria 
for authorization are applied softly in order not to slow down the development 
of the market. ANME also gives training courses to SWH consultants for di-
mensioning systems for commercial buildings24 and for supervising the construc-
tion work; an authorization system is also used here. Consumers get a one-year 
guarantee for installation, a 5-year guarantee for the water tank and a 10-year 
guarantee for the solar collector. 
Local Government as Facilitator of Supply Chain Networks 
In many CT promotion programs, a central government agency acts as coordina-
tor. But partly inspired by Agenda 2125 initiatives, municipalities across the world 
have become increasingly engaged as local promoters and coordinators of EERE 
finance. Rooftop PV, solar water heaters, geo-exchange cooling, EE-projects, and 
water supply and waste disposal projects are implemented everywhere; hence the 
importance of including local government as actors in market transformation pro-
grams. Their role can be described as follows: 
• A ‘one-stop shop’ for householders, accessed by calling a freephone number.  
• KES provided householders with advice on energy efficiency measures, discount 
prices for installation and access to cashback and preferential loan schemes. 
• Householders would be referred to an approved installer, from the network set up 
by KES, who would inspect the property and recommend appropriate energy 
efficiency work.  
• Once the work was completed, the householder paid the installer, and would then 
be eligible for cashback payments from KES.  
• The quality of the scheme was monitored through inspections of 10% of the works, 
questionnaires sent out with cashback payments, and telephone surveys.  
• The installers – of measures such as cavity wall insulation, loft insulation, draught-
proofing of doors and windows, heating controls, hot-water tank insulation, floor 
insulation and condensing boilers – were selected following a tender published in 
local newspapers. 
• The successful installers received specific energy efficiency training to help 
householders identify the areas where work could be most beneficial. Installers 
paid a referral fee of 5% to KES, to fund the scheme’s administration.  
• Three local credit unions became partners in the scheme, offering preferential loan 
facilities for householders to install energy efficiency measures.  Without this 
access to dedicated finance, it is likely that many householders would not have 
been able to improve their homes’ energy efficiency.
 
Fig. 4. “Kirklees Energy Services” (KES)  
                                                          
24 In the previous GEF project suppliers tended to over-dimension the system to charge 
higher prices. 
25 The programme action plan that came out of the 1992 United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development, the Rio Summit. It was given the title Agenda 21 be-
cause of the 21 chapters dealing with a wide range of aspects relating to sustainable de-
velopment. 
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x To execute their planning and regulatory functions for approvals of CT 
projects efficiently; this lowers project risk and pre-investment costs; 
x Provision of information to consumers; 
x Quality control of implemented CT-work; and 
x Organisation of PPPs for program implementation. Several successful PPPs 
can be identified worldwide. 
Figure 4 gives an example of a scheme for promoting EE in the building sector: 
the “one-stop clearing house” administered by the British municipality of Kirk-
lees. It is composed of: (i) impartial information to consumers about AE, (ii) the 
administration of subsidy payments to AE, (iii) technical assistance to the supply 
side, (iv) quality control with performance and (v) bank loans to consumers for 
investments in environmental finance. 
5 Bank Engagement Programs: Overcoming Hurdles 
to Entry  
5.1 Justification for Bank Engagement Programs 
The financial community is seldom in want of demand for its products. It has al-
ternative business opportunities other than environmental finance to expand into. 
During the pilot phases of initial market development, transactions are small and 
start-up costs are high. At this stage, most RE companies in developing countries 
are frustrated by the lack of bank interest in their businesses, either to finance their 
operations or to lend to their customers.26 For this phase, a bank sector- specific 
framework to overcome the entry hurdles is usually required to ensure bank en-
gagement.  
A typical support program includes the components discussed below. 
5.2 Refinancing 
Refinance facilities are found in almost all countries, normally financed by soft 
loans and grants from donors and international development banks. They may be 
the most important instrument of all. They give the banks a direct economic incen-
tive to engage in environmental finance: because of refinance, the bank’s in-
volvement in environmental finance adds to its overall financial volume and does 
not reduce its financial engagement in conventional lending activities. Their terms 
can match the longer tenor of loans for EE&RE. 
                                                          
26 “They claim that banks don’t understand their business, their technology or their cus-
tomers and generally lack incentive to innovate the financial services they have on of-
fer.” Usher & Touhami (2006). 
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KfW’s environmental finance line for investments by home and apartment own-
ers in the EE of buildings is an interesting example of a well conceived and inte-
grated refinancing program, which is led and organised by a national development 
bank. A few aspects are highlighted below. 
x KfW provides a refinance line for loans by homeowners in EE. 
x Households go to their local banks to apply for a loan. Loans have 10 years 
duration, low rate of interest (subsidized by KfW) and a grace period. 
x The loans finance only specified packages of typical EE measures in “older 
houses”. 
x A certified energy engineer approves a priori the package and after finalisa-
tion of the works, the quality of implementation. 
x If the implemented package results in an EE standard equal to the norms of 
new buildings, the home owner gets a 5% reduction in the repayment of 
principle, and a 12.5% reduction if the EE standard is 30% better than the 
building norm for new houses. 
5.3 Information and Awareness Building, Capacity Building 
Information and moral persuasion by government is required in all countries. The 
process involves multi-actor discussions between, on the one hand the financial 
sector, and on the other hand the ministries responsible for finance and energy as 
well as stakeholder representatives from the private sector. The government lays 
out its EE&RE policy goals and implementation, specifying the roles of each ma-
jor actor. With the help of the donor community and foreign technical assistance, 
the government can inform the financial sector about quantified estimates of the 
future market demand for environment finance once the government policies are 
implemented. 
With the help of the donor community and foreign consultants, governments can 
provide cost-shared capacity building (i) in the design and administration of new en-
vironmental finance and (ii) in basic technical appraisal of EE&RE projects.  
5.4 Reducing Risks for Banks 
Guarantee facilities for loans to customers who have little collateral to offer have 
been developed in several countries. In theory, partial risk guarantees to local 
banks for loan repayment as a collateral substitute are a good instrument; but in 
practice they result often in serious moral hazard.  
Sustainable Energy Authority (SEA) in Sri Lanka provides a 75% guarantee on 
loans for RE and EE investments for up to USD 100,000. For this it charges the 
banks an annual premium of 0.5% of the amount guaranteed or loan amount out-
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standing. The premium is expected to mainly meet the cost of facility management. 
The scheme helps to solve the problem of lack of collateral of small-scale investors. 
The banks perform the financial due diligence review of the investor and the project; 
if it is positive, the bank forwards the project proposal to the Guarantee Fund to un-
dertake the technical review and approve the guarantee. Normally, the loan repay-
ment period will be the project payback period guaranteed by the ESCO plus one 
year; the maximum repayment period is 6 years. SEA’s guarantee facility is en-
dowed with USD 500,000. A fund reserve of 15% of loans guaranteed, based on the 
highest non-performing loan portfolio of leading banks in Sri Lanka, is set aside as a 
loan loss reserve. Based on this and the 75% guarantee limit, the fund can leverage 
close to USD 5 million in loans for EE&RE projects. 
Guarantee schemes for loans to solar home PV systems, usually with involve-
ment of vendors for the recycling of recovered systems by banks, have also been 
put in place in Sri Lanka as in other countries. 
5.5 Facilitating Financing Channels for Bank Loans to CT-Investments 
In the Tunisian PROSOL program, the government used its regulatory powers to 
persuade the state owned power utility STEG to channel bank loans to consumers 
for investments in solar water heaters. Consumers paid back their loans, including 
payment of interest, through a fee on the monthly electricity bill. This turns a mul-
titude of tiny loan transactions for the financing institution into one single large 
loan which is given to the utility. 
Another and by now well-tested avenue is for the government to act as origina-
tor of collaboration and financial links between established commercial institu-
tions which provide the basic finance and microfinance institutions, which provide 
loans to small-scale business and households investing in EE&RE. 
6 Concluding Remarks 
The prospects for environmental finance look promising even in the short term. 
The need for coherent frameworks is increasingly understood by governments, the 
designers of integrated policy packages can draw for inspiration and evidence on a 
large number of proven tools and implementation approaches and the financing 
community sees a market which grows from year to year! 
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